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Many legal scholars argue that deduction is at the center of legal
reasoning.1 It also holds pride of place in legal-writing and legaltheory texts.2 Some, on the other hand, have argued that deduction is
not central—or at least not necessary—to the process of legal
reasoning.3 Others have gone further, arguing that deduction and the
IRAC or CREAC organizational paradigm4 are hallmarks of an
oppressively racist and misogynistic legal system.5 This review is no
Brian N. Larson, J.D., Ph.D. is an Associate Professor of Law and Arts and
Humanities Fellow at Texas A&M University School of Law.
1 See, e.g., LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, DEMYSTIFYING LEGAL
REASONING 64 (2008) (identifying deduction as one of three forms of
reasoning applicable to law, along with “empirical reasoning” and “moral
reasoning through the method of reflective equilibrium”); RICHARD A.
POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 42 (1990) (“[M]ost legal
questions are resolved syllogistically.”) On the difference between syllogism
and deduction, see infra text accompanying notes 21–26.
2 See, e.g., LINDA H. EDWARDS, LEGAL WRITING: PROCESS, ANALYSIS, AND
ORGANIZATION 78–79 (7th ed. 2018); DAVID S. ROMANTZ & KATHLEEN ELLIOTT
VINSON, LEGAL ANALYSIS: THE FUNDAMENTAL SKILL 65–66 (2d ed. 2009).
3 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.3, in 19 ARISTOTLE IN 23 VOLUMES (Harris
Rackham
trans.,
1934),
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/
text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0054%3Abekker%20page%3D1094
[https://perma.cc/67P3-2PUQ] (“It is equally unreasonable to accept
merely probable conclusions from a mathematician and to demand strict
demonstration from an orator.”); Brian N. Larson, Law’s Enterprise:
Argumentation Schemes and Legal Analogy, 87 U. CIN. L. REV. 663, 683
(2019); LLOYD WEINREB, LEGAL REASON: THE USE OF ANALOGY IN LEGAL
ARGUMENT 86 (2d ed. 2016).
4 ROMANTZ & VINSON, supra note 2, at 120 (characterizing IRAC and CREAC
as “organizational paradigms”).
5 Elizabeth Berenguer, Lucy Jewel & Teri A. McMurtry-Chubb, Gut
Renovations: Using Critical and Comparative Rhetoric to Remodel How
the Law Addresses Privilege and Power, 23 HARV. LATINX L. REV. 205, 205–
06 (2020) (criticizing “traditional legal rhetoric,” which “uses deductive
reasoning in the form of a syllogism, illustrated by the well-known law school
acronym IRAC”); Catherine E. Hundleby, Feminist Perspectives on
Argumentation § 3.1, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward
N. Zalta ed. spring 2021 ed.), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/
spr2021/entries/feminism-argumentation [https://perma.cc/CYB9-PHJS]
*
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place to rehearse or extend those arguments, but Catarina Dutilh
Novaes’ book The Dialogical Roots of Deduction: Historical,
Cognitive, and Philosophical Perspectives on Reasoning6 is essential
for understanding them, for understanding what deduction is, has
been, and perhaps should be. Of course, as Dutilh Novaes says, “it is
not surprising that philosophers, mathematicians, and scientists
would be impressed by the deductive method, with its allure of
certainty and its promise of unshakable foundations.”7 This review
does not take special pains to evaluate Dutilh Novaes’ principal
claims.8 Instead, my evaluation is that this book succeeds broadly in
achieving her hopes that the reader leaves “with a richer, more
nuanced conception of deduction,”9 including “obtain[ing] a better
appreciation of how much of a cognitive oddity deduction really is.”10
So if you talk about what lawyers, judges, and your students do as
“deduction,” “deductive,” “syllogisms”’ or “syllogistic,” you should
read this book just to be sure you know what you’re talking about.
Dr. Catarina Dutilh Novaes is a professor of philosophy in the
Faculty of Humanities, Reasoning, and Argumentation at Vrije

(discussing work of Andrea Nye considering “certain historical points when
deductive logic’s operation as the default interpretive mechanism for
arguments may have had an oppressive influence”).
6 CATARINA DUTILH NOVAES, THE DIALOGICAL ROOTS OF DEDUCTION:
HISTORICAL, COGNITIVE, AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON REASONING
(2021).
7 Id. at 4. She could certainly have included lawyers and judges in this list.
8 Though I feel comfortable saying that her reasoning supports the
conclusions she draws from the premises with which she starts, I am not
really qualified to evaluate the quality of those premises or the alternative
premises and explanatory hypotheses that other theorists of logic might put
forward in response to Dutilh Novaes. But see generally Bruno Ramos
Mendonça, The Dialogical Roots of Deduction: Historical, Cognitive, and
Philosophical Perspectives on Reasoning, 44 MANUSCRITO: REVISTA
INTERNACIONAL
DE
FILOSOFIA
157
(2021)
(book
review),
https://doi.org/10.1590/0100-6045.2021.V44N2.BM [https://perma.cc/
49K7-P6GB] (reviewing the substance of DUTILH NOVAES, supra note 6,
favorably).
9 Id. at 237.
10 Id. at 236.
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Universiteit Amsterdam.11 Dutilh Novaes was born and received her
early university training in Brazil before moving to the Netherlands
for her graduate training.12 One focus of her research is the philosophy
and history of logic.13 She is also a contemporary theorist on
argumentation and critical theory, among whose works are attempts
to bring the work of Rudolph Carnap (a leading figure in the logical
positivist movement) into conversation with Michel Foucault (one of
the twentieth century’s leading critical theorists);14 and to position
contemporary critical philosopher Sally Haslanger’s “ameliorative
analysis” against the work of Carnap.15 Dutilh Novaes is well situated
to write a book with the scope she takes on here.
Dutilh Novaes’ principal claim is that “deduction has dialogical
roots, and . . . these dialogical roots are still largely present both in
theories and in practices where deduction features prominently.”16
For Dutilh Novaes, deduction is a “cognitive technology,”17 not to “be
viewed as genetically encoded, but rather as a product of cultural
processes.”18 On my view, she asserts that the dialogical contexts in
which deduction appears drive the motivation to use it, its
participants, and the arguments that they produce. Discussing
Prof. Dr. Catarina Dutilh Novaes, VRIJE UNIVERSITEIT AMSTERDAM,
https://research.vu.nl/en/persons/catarina-dutilh-novaes [https://perma.
cc/PTK3-Q7VL] (last visited Dec. 10, 2021).
12
About,
Catarina
Dutilh
Novaes
(Mar.
19,
2019),
https://www.cdutilhnovaes.com/ about [https://perma.cc/Z8GF-YZZ6].
13 E.g., THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO MEDIEVAL LOGIC (Catarina Dutilh
Novaes & Stephen Read eds., 2016); Catarina Dutilh Novaes, A Dialogical
Conception of Explanation in Mathematical Proofs, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF
MATHEMATICS EDUCATION TODAY 81 (Paul Ernest ed., 2018); Matthew
Duncombe & Catarina Dutilh Novaes, Dialectic and Logic in Aristotle and
his Tradition, 37 HIST. & PHIL. OF LOGIC 1 (2016).
14
Catarina Dutilh Novaes, Carnap Meets Foucault: Conceptual
Engineering and Genealogical Investigations, INQUIRY (Dec. 17, 2020),
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/0020174X.2020.1860122
[https://perma.cc/2K25-VYH5].
15 Catarina Dutilh Novaes, Carnapian Explication and Ameliorative
Analysis: A Systematic Comparison, 197 SYNTHESE 1011, 1011 (2020).
16 DUTILH NOVAES, supra note 6, at ix; see id. at 29.
17 Id. at 26, 28 (“[M]ore specifically, it is a technical/theoretical concept (a
term of art), restricted to circles of specialists (philosophers, logicians,
mathematicians).”).
18 Id. at xii.
11
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deduction this way sets it in opposition to Kant and modern thinkers
who follow him, for whom “logic pertains above all to the structure of
thought as such and the operations of the mind.”19 Dutilh Novaes
attempts to show that conceptualizing deduction as dialogic sheds
light on its philosophy, history, and cognitive nature.20
The balance of this review addresses matters in the book that
should be of particular interest to readers in the legal rhetoric and
communication community. First, it addresses some concepts central
to Dutilh Novaes’ effort. Second, it surveys the book’s organization,
identifying some key observations and conclusions that she supports
with careful evidence and argumentation. Third, it addresses Dutilh
Novaes’ attention to non-European and non-Western research and
logical traditions. Finally, it considers some difficult and technical
passages, noting those readers should work through because the
payoff is worth it and others I believe readers in our field might skip.
A. Concepts Central to Dutilh Novaes’ Effort
Because Dutilh Novaes’ book is about deduction, and because (as
noted above) terms like “deduction” and “syllogism” are bandied
about in the law, it would help to have some clear sense of what each
of these terms means, both within and outside of Dutilh Novaes’
treatment. She first defines a deductive argument as “(i) a stepwise
process, (ii) where each step ‘follows logically’ (iii) from assumed or
previously established statements.”21 This is much like the proof or

Id. at 146; see id. at 19 (“[T]he idea that deductive logic provides the canons
for human agents . . . to manage their cognitive lives arguably only became
fully articulated in the work of Immanuel Kant . . . .”).
20 Id. at 29–33; id. at 32 (“The three key properties of a deductive argument
described in Chapter 1 can then all be given a natural dialogical
explanation . . . .”); id. at 33 (“[D]eductive reasoning should be
conceptualized as dialogic also at the cognitive level, and this
conceptualization would lead to better learning outcomes.”); id. at 34
(“[S]ocial dynamics of proof in mathematics communities roughly follow the
dialectic of proofs and refutations described by Lakatos . . . and are thus
essentially dialogical.”) (citing IMRE LAKATOS, PROOFS AND REFUTATIONS:
THE LOGIC OF MATHEMATICAL DISCOVERY (1976)).
21 Id. at 5.
19
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“apodeixis” of classical logic, where each step is a deduction, but the
discourse consists of many such steps.22
Aristotle is credited with being the first in the world to formalize
a system of deductive reasoning, which he referred to as
“sullogismos.”23 How to translate that term from his Greek is a matter
of difficulty, as Dutilh Novaes explains:
‘Deduction’ may be too broad, as Aristotle’s definition of a
syllogism excludes some arguments that we would be
prepared to describe as deductions (e.g. single-premise
arguments). But ‘syllogism’ is too narrow in that it is
strongly associated with the restricted class of arguments
for which Aristotle develops a formal theory in the Prior
Analytics, restricted to categorical sentences of the A, E, I,
and O forms.24
The A, E, I, and O forms to which Dutilh Novaes refers here are
the four types of categorical sentences that Aristotle worked with in
the Prior Analytics:
A: All A is B.
E: No A is B.
I: Some A is B.
O: Some A is not B.
So, an example of a valid sullogismos from Aristotle’s perspective
is this: All B are A; some B are C; therefore, some C are A.25 Note that
See Robin Smith, Aristotle’s Logic, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., Fall 2020), https://plato.stanford.edu/
archives/fall2020/entries/aristotle-logic/ [https://perma.cc/N6LC-HF7F];
Christoph Rapp, Aristotle’s Rhetoric, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., Spring 2010), https://plato.stanford.
edu/archives/spr2010/entries/aristotle-rhetoric/ [https://perma.cc/548ES6HS].
23 See ARISTOTLE, PRIOR ANALYTICS 229–235 app. I (Robin Smith trans.,
Hackett Publ’g Co., 1989); see DUTILH NOVAES, supra note 6, at 109 (“This
theory is rightly described as the first regimentation of deductive reasoning
in the history of logic, and thus as the first logical theory as such.”).
24 DUTILH NOVAES, supra note 6, at 110 n.1.
25 ARISTOTLE, supra note 23, at 5 (“For let A belong to every B and B to some
C . . . . [then] it is necessary for A to belong to some C.”) This example
22
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each sentence attributes a predicate to some or all of its subject; the
predicate is not conditional. These sentences may be useful for
reasoning to certain kinds of scientific conclusions, Aristotle’s central
concern at this point. But they are not the kind of deductions that we
need in law to adjudicate a particular case. For those, we need
conditional propositions in a form something like this:
Major Premise: [Any person] who operates a vehicle in the
municipal park [is] guilty of a gross misdemeanor.
Minor Premise: Mr. Biker operated a vehicle in a municipal
park.
Conclusion:
Mr. Biker is guilty of a gross misdemeanor.26
Here, unlike in Aristotle’s syllogism, the major premise is
conditional, with the presence of some antecedent (a person
operating a vehicle) determining some consequent (misdemeanor
guilt); and the minor premise refers to a specific individual. This is
the modus ponens form of argument.27
Dutilh Novaes’ definition of deductive argument encompasses all
these forms of argument. She characterizes deductive arguments as
having three key characteristics: necessary truth-preservation,
stepwise or perspicuous structure, and belief bracketing.28 Necessary
truth-preservation means that if the premises of a deductive
argument are true, the conclusion must be true.29 These arguments
are thus “monotonic,” meaning that the addition of any premise(s)
will not change the truth condition of the conclusion.30 In this sense,
illustrates one characteristic of Aristotle’s categorical sentences that is not
consistent with all conceptions of deduction: There is at least one instance of
every predicate. For Aristotle, “All B are A” is true only if there is a least one
B. See STEPHEN F. BARKER, THE ELEMENTS OF LOGIC 44 (6th ed. 2003). A legal
rule does not require this instantiation: “If anyone operates a vehicle in the
park, they are guilty of a misdemeanor” could be true even if no one ever has
or ever does operate a vehicle in the park.
26 Larson, supra note 3, at 676.
27 PATRICK J. HURLEY & LORI WATSON, A CONCISE INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC
382–83 (13th ed. 2018); Larson, supra note 3, at 676. This represents a
propositional logic. HURLEY & WATSON, supra, at 381–83. There are other
logics, of course. Id. at 327.
28 DUTILH NOVAES, supra note 6, at 5–8.
29 Id. at 5.
30 Id.
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then, deductive arguments are indefeasible: if the premises are true,
nothing can defeat the argument.31 Dutilh Novaes argues throughout
the book that this “necessary truth-preservation is in fact a cognitive
oddity.”32
Perspicuity refers to the connections between the steps in a
deductive argument. It is “very naturally understood in dialogical
terms; dialogue itself is a stepwise, dynamic process, where parties
typically take turns in making contributions to the conversation as
reactions to what has been said previously.”33 Even in mathematical
proofs, however, not every step need be included, depending on
context.34 There are “varying levels of granularity of a proof
presentation,” where some steps may be omitted depending on the
context.35
Deduction requires bracketing belief, because its “focus is
exclusively on the connection between premises and conclusions, not

31

The alternative, a defeasible argument, is still rational:
In argumentation theory, just as in property law, something that
is defeasible stands until and unless something comes along to
defeat it. Brian Bix thus described a defeasible concept as
“subject to an analytical structure such that certain criteria
justified the assertion of some legal claim (like ‘valid contract’),
but that claim might subsequently be defeated by the discovery
of additional facts.” Brian H. Bix, Defeasibility and Open
Texture, in THE LOGIC OF LEGAL REQUIREMENTS: ESSAYS ON
DEFEASIBILITY 193, 197 (Jordi Ferrer Beltrán & Giovanni Battista
Ratti eds. 2012) (citing H.L.A. Hart, The Ascription of
Responsibility and Rights, 49 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC., 175
(1948–49)). Pollock described reasoning as defeasible if “the
premises taken by themselves may justify us in accepting the
conclusion, but when additional information is added, that
conclusion may no longer be justified.” John L. Pollock,
Defeasible Reasoning, 11 COGNITIVE SCI. 481, 481 (1987).

Brian N. Larson, Endogenous and Dangerous, 22 NEV. L.J. (forthcoming
2022) (manuscript at 4 n.9), https://papers.ssrn.com/ sol3/papers.cfm
?abstract_id=3814925 [https://perma.cc/YL7J-HWBS].
32 DUTILH NOVAES, supra note 6, at 62.
33 Id. at 65.
34 Id. at 7.
35 Id. at 35.
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on the nature or plausibility of the premises or conclusions.”36 It’s
easy to see why empirical evidence suggests that folks don’t like to
bracket belief: “Try to explain to a group of uninitiated, logically naïve
interlocutors (say, high-school students) that ‘All cows are blue, and
all blue things are made of stone, so all cows are made of stone’” is a
valid deduction.37 Those students will likely get hung up on the truth
(or falsity) of the premises, which speaks to the argument’s
soundness, rather than its deductive validity.38 Lawyers and judges
frequently engage in belief bracketing when they infer conclusions
from assumptions or argue in the alternative. The arguer might say,
“Assuming the court were to rule in this way, [list of calamities].” Or
“The rule is A, but even if the rule were B, the outcome would be the
same because [list of reasons].”
We naturally understand some of the appeal of deduction,
including particularly the “higher degree of certainty for a conclusion
(given the truth of the premises) than reasoning methods that do not
guarantee truth-preservation . . . .”39 Dutilh Novaes argues, though,
that “[t]hese are desirable properties for a method of reasoning in the
context of scientific (including mathematical) inquiry, but are
basically out of place in more mundane situations.”40 I’ve argued
elsewhere that law is such a situation, and that so-called “deductions”
in the law are neither indefeasible nor monotonic.41 Given this
conceptual introduction, we can consider the organization of the
book.
B. Claims and Structure of Dutilh Novaes’ Argument
In Part I, Dutilh Novaes sets out the book’s principal concerns
from a philosophical perspective. In Chapter 1, she identifies her main
questions, particularly where deduction is found and how is it used,
what is the nature of the necessity in deduction, and what is the point
of deduction. Here she offers her principal claim and some subsidiary
standpoints. She carefully argues for and describes her methodology
in first half of Chapter 2 and summarizes the book’s arguments in its
36
37
38
39
40
41

Id. at 7.
See id. at 8.
See id.
Id. at 236.
Id.
Larson, supra note 31, at 16.
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second half. She describes her model of the “prover-skeptic dialogue”
for deduction in Chapter 3, characterizing deduction as involving (in
many cases) an actual dialogue and (in even more cases) an
internalized skeptic, supporting a dialogical framework but with only
one speaker or writer. In Chapter 4, Dutilh Novaes uses her dialogical
model to explain the key features of deduction and then shows that it
explains some other problems in logic.
In Part II, she moves to the history of deduction, arguing “that
deduction emerged against the background of specific dialogical
practices and retains many of the original dialogical components
throughout the centuries.”42 Dutilh Novaes first traces the uptake and
development of Aristotelian deduction in medieval Europe and the
Arab/Islamic world. She then describes the erasure of much of the
dialogical roots of deduction in the Cartesian era and thereafter. This
treatment begins with mathematics and dialectic in ancient Greece in
Chapter 5. Chapter 6 is important: The first two-thirds deal with
Aristotle’s “syllogistic” and are a must-read for anyone bandying the
term “syllogism” about. The final third is a brief but not
oversimplified survey of the historical development of logic in the
Indian subcontinent (including Afghanistan and Pakistan) and in
China. Chapter 7 follows the history of deduction to the nineteenth
century, explaining “why and how the dialogical origins of logic and
deduction were slowly . . . forgotten in Europe.”43
In Part III, Dutilh Novaes “discuss[es] empirical evidence that
bears on the hypothesis that deductive reasoning is best understood
in dialogic terms.”44 She presents in Chapter 8 “empirical evidence on
how humans reason, individually as well as in groups, specifically
with respect to deductive problems.”45 She shows that “content in
general and background beliefs in particular have a strong effect on
reasoning performance, and this includes both facilitating effects . . .
[and] hindering effects.”46 In Chapter 9, she explores the development
of deductive reasoning in the cognition of the individual (its
“ontogeny,” as she calls it),47 and in Chapter 10, its development
DUTILH NOVAES, supra note 6, at 87.
Id. at 132.
44 Id. at 151 (identifying “evidence . . . from different fields, especially
psychology of reasoning, cognitive science, and mathematics education”).
45 Id. at 151.
46 Id. at 152–53.
47
Id. at 169.
42
43
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within populations either as an evolutionary adaptation or as a
cultural tool (its “phylogeny,” as she calls it).48 Finally, in Chapter 11,
she takes a detailed look at the way deduction unfolds in the work of
academic mathematics before offering some brief remarks in a
concluding chapter.
In addition to supporting her main claim about the dialogical
nature of deductive argument, Dutilh Novaes’ book supports two less
technical claims, one about deduction’s typical role in human
cognition, and the other about the appropriate contexts for deduction.
Those who read the book will almost certainly concur with her
conclusion that deduction is not a natural practice for humans: She
notes that “[i]n much of the literature in philosophy of logic and on
deductive reasoning more generally, it is often assumed that
deduction is a widespread phenomenon.”49 But “whether deductive
reasoning is ubiquitous is by and large an empirical question, and the
empirical data currently available suggest that it is not.”50
As for the appropriate contexts for deduction, Dutilh Novaes
concludes that deductive reasoning is for specialist users and does not
model reasoning that is by nature defeasible. She claims that
“deductive reasoning belongs in niches of specialists:
mathematicians, scientists, and philosophers, and even in these
niches it does not completely overpower other forms of reasoning.”51
Omitted from her list is the field of law, and this may be a
controversial contention for those who describe (at least some) legal
reasoning as deductive. Nevertheless, I concur with her claim that
“[h]ow best to model defeasible reasoning formally . . . is still a matter
of contention, but it is clear that monotonic, indefeasible deductive
logics are utterly inadequate for this job.”52 In my view, all legal
reasoning is defeasible and thus not deductive. To describe legal
reasoning as “deductive” is to dress it in indefeasibility that it cannot
exhibit, reenforcing a formalist view of what lawyers do to the
detriment of the more nuanced view that reflects professional
realities.
48

Id. at 187.
Id. at 10.
50 Id. at 11; accord id. at 10 (“Tellingly, a survey article by one of the leading
researchers in the field . . . is informally known among psychologists as the
‘death of deduction.’”).
51 Id. at 12.
52 Id. at 11.
49
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C. Treatment of Non-Western Traditions
In developing her arguments, Dutilh Novaes is careful to give
attention to traditions other than the Greek and European. Given that
she is a scholar with experience in critical theory and a Latina trained
initially in a developing country, this should be no surprise. She notes
the exclusion of other traditions in the historiography of
mathematics53 and addresses concerns of colonialism in the
“empirical” or non-European vs. “analytic” or European
orientations.54 Her discussion of data from cognitive studies includes
participants from Africa and Brazil,55 and she relies on the work of
many woman scholars in the field of logic, dominated for centuries—
millennia, really—by men.
Further, Dutilh Novaes is careful to explain the development of
logical traditions within their social contexts. In Chapter 7, she
devotes considerable attention to the work of medieval Arab and
Muslim scholars, including Avicenna, who “famously identified
concepts as the subject matter of logic,”56 a move that may have
influenced similar thinking by Kant. She concludes “that fully-fledged
deduction does not emerge in China or India . . . , even if in both
places (especially in India) debating practices were of paramount
importance.”57 But she calls on the reader “not to say that having given
rise to the concept of deduction makes Ancient Greek logic
automatically superior. In fact, regarding complexity and
sophistication, it is fair to say that classical Indian logic, in particular,
is on a par with Ancient Greek logic.”58
D. Technical Sections to Read—or Skip
Through this wide-ranging discussion, Dutilh Novaes’ writing
style is very accessible. Nevertheless, the material can sometimes
become rather technical. This paragraph and the next identify certain
of the more technical sections that are important for understanding
53
54
55
56
57
58

Id. at 93.
Id. at 176, 176 n.5.
Id. at 176–77.
Id. at 141.
Id. at 123.
Id.
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the key points of the book and other sections readers can afford to
skim if they are not central to their reading goals. Chapter 3 is rather
technical, especially the first half, but readers should attempt it
because it helps make sense of Section 3.3, which is itself an important
framework for the rest of the book. It also deserves attention of legaltheory readers to link this work to the law, as it describes the kinds of
roles that legal reasoners may take on in dialogical exchange. Near the
other end of the book, Chapter 11 is quite technical but interesting to
show that even mathematical proofs play a variety of social roles,
depending on context, and that successful ones are constructed with
their social contexts in mind. In particular, Dutilh Novaes offers three
case studies that are quite technical but very useful for showing the
social dimensions of these arguments.59
A number of other discussions are probably only of interest to
specialists in logic, including brief discussions of non-monotonic
deductive systems,60 logical pluralism,61 and the nature of deductive
necessity62 and logical consequence.63 There are also longer
discussions that many readers may wish to skip. One example is the
quite-technical discussion in Chapter 3 of dialogical models that are
precursors or alternatives to her “prover-skeptic” model.64 Other
more extended discussions that are difficult and may not yield great
benefit to those in our field include the normativity of logic,65
paradoxes,66 arguments “leading to the impossible” or reductio ad
absurdum,67 the kinds of philosophic entities that mathematical
proofs are,68 and finally, computational and probabilistic proofs.69
Readers encountering the sections described in this paragraph may
safely, in my view, skim them to get to more important content.

59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69

Id. at 216–21.
Id. at 5–6.
Id. at 82–84.
Id. at 12–17.
Id. at 73–74.
Id. at 39–46.
Id. at 74–78.
Id. at 78–82.
Id. at 120–22.
Id. at 206–09.
Id. at 228–32.
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E. Conclusion
It would be a gross misrepresentation to call this an easy book. In
some 237 pages of text, Dutilh Novaes presents cautious and
sophisticated arguments in support of her principal claim, that
deduction has dialogical roots and that those roots shed light on the
history, philosophy, and cognition of deduction. The reader who
completes the book may or may not embrace the author’s conclusion,
but the effort will pay off in a much richer understanding of
deduction, a concept that is central to our talk about—and according
to some, our practice of—legal reasoning. This book is well worth the
time of scholars of legal theory, argumentation, rhetoric, and
communication who wish to engage with arguments about the
appropriate role, if any, of deduction and IRAC or CREAC in legal
reasoning.

